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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DENNIS EARL WHEELER
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Docket No. 970256-CA

-vsDIANE DAWN WHEELER,

Priority Classification 15

Defendant/Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE JUDGE BOHLING PRESIDING
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-(l) (h) (1953 as

amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue before the Court is whether the lower court
correctly set aside the parties' divorce decree with regard to
the military retirement benefits where the lower court found no
consideration for Appellee's stipulation waiving her right to her
share of the retirement account and Appellee immediately promptly

1

moved to set aside the decree.
"A trial court's decision to grant or deny a 60(b) motion
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."

State v.

Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah App. 1994)(citations omitted).
"Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are against
the clear weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous with due
consideration given to the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses."

Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 945 P.2d

180, 186 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted) .
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no provisions determinative to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action and motion arising from the decree
entered.

The parties were married for seven years.

The parties

entered a stipulation in 1995 in which Appellee agreed to waive
her right to her share of Appellant's retirement benefits.

The

agreement was entered into by mistake and excusable neglect by
Appellee as evidenced by the lack of consideration for the waiver
of her rights to the only marital asset and her prompt motion to
set aside the stipulation and decree.
II.COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The court below, the Honorable Judge Bohling presiding,
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entered the Decree of Divorce on December 7, 1995.
was entered pursuant to a stipulation.

The decree

Appellee retained new

counsel and then made a timely motion to set aside the decree
because of excusable neglect and mistake, pursuant to Rule 60(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

After hearing, Judge

Bohling ordered that the decree be set aside concerning the
retirement benefits due to mistake and excusable neglect, as
evidenced by the lack of consideration for Appellee's waiver and
her prompt motion to set aside.
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed on April 28, 1997.
III.STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on November 4, 1988.

(Affidavit of

Defendant, attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein).
During the marriage, Appellee was primarily a homemaker and took
care of the parties' two children.

(Exhibit " A " ) .

Appellant was

employed by the United States Army and had been so employed for
approximately ten years.

(Exhibit " A " ) .

Appellee retained Steven C. Russell as her counsel to
represent her in this divorce action.

(Exhibit " A " ) .

Appellee

entered into the settlement agreement based upon misinformation
given to her by her then counsel as well as the opposing party.
(Exhibit " A " ) .

Even at the initial hearing on the 60(b) motion,

opposing counsel argued that Appellee waived her right to her
share of the retirement benefits "because it wasn't of a great
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deal of worth to her."

(Transcript of the Hearing, p. 12, 1. 2-

4, an excerpt is attached as Exhibit "B" and incorporated
herein).
In addition, Appellee was repeatedly misinformed that she
would never get any of the retirement benefits.

(Exhibit " A " ) .

The misunderstanding concerning her right to her share of the
retirement benefits was raised again in Appellant's Docketing
Statement for appeal where Appellant stated that "[t]he
[Appellee] does not have a legal right to the [Appellant's]
nonvested military retirement benefits, inasmuch as the parties
were not married for ten (10) years as required by the Uniform
Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408."
(Appellant's Docketing Statement, p. 3, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein).

There is no

doubt that Appellant's share of the retirement benefits has
substantial value to her and there is no doubt that she has a
legal right to her share according to Utah law.

(Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, 58, attached as Exhibit "D" and
incorporated herein).

The mistake, based on the misunderstanding

of Appellant's right to her share of the retirement benefits, is
further evidenced by the lack of consideration for the waiver of
such right.

(Exhibit "D", 511).

Upon retaining new counsel, Appellee was informed of her
rights under Utah law and became aware of the mistaken
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interpretation of the law.

(Exhibit " A " ) .

Had the correct

information been available to Appellee, she would not have
entered into the stipulation waiving her rights to her share of
the retirement benefits without consideration.

(Exhibit " A " ) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court's ruling should be affirmed because (1)
Appellant has failed to cite to the record in support of his
appeal; (2) Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence as is
required in order to overturn the lower court's findings of fact;
(3) Appellant's appeal is based on facts and issues not raised at
the trial court level; and (4) the lower court did not abuse its
discretion in granting Appellee's motion.

In addition, Appellee

should be awarded her costs and attorney's fees incurred in
connection with this appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE MERITS OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT NEED NOT BE REACHED
DUE TO APPELLANT'S LACK OF CITATION TO THE RECORD TO
SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT.

The Utah Appellate Court has consistently held that if
counsel on appeal does not provide citations to the record, we
need not reach the merits of his or her substantive claims."
State v. Ortiz, 782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989)(citing Arnica
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah App. 1989).

5

In the Facts section of Appellant's Brief, Appellant fails to
cite to the record at all on page two.

Appellant's only

citations to the record are to an unsigned statement by Susan
Bradford and the Affidavit of Steven Russell.

In addition,

Appellant argues many other facts that are absent from the
record.
Appellant's Brief argues that Appellee "agreed not to pursue
her small share of Appellant's military pension in consideration
for his promise not to assert claims of greater visitation
rights, his relinquishment of claims he had rising out of the
$25,000 he sent to her during his absence, and his agreement to
settle the matter quickly." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 3 ) . However
there is no citation to the record.

The reason there is no

citation to the record is that this information is absent from
the record.

In fact, at the lower court, Appellant argued that

Appellee relinquished her right to the retirement benefits
"because it wasn't of a great deal of worth to her."

Nowhere in

the transcript, or any affidavit, did Appellant allege that
Appellee exchanged her right to the retirement benefits for
Appellant's promise to forgo a claim for $25,000.00 in money
provided during the separation.
Appellant provides no citation to any agreement to exchange
Appellee's share of the retirement benefits for Appellant's
promise to forego claims concerning visitation or any money.

6

The

statement of Susan Bradford does not contain any such agreement,
nor does the Affidavit of Mr. Russell contain any information
concerning a trade of visitation or some money claim in exchange
for Appellee's right to her share of the retirement benefits.

In

fact, Mr. Russell states that Appellee "readily agreed that it
was in the best interests of the minor children that the
[Appellant] have extended periods of visitation . . . ."
(Exhibit "B" of Appellant's Brief).
pro

Clearly there was no

quid

quo concerning visitation.
The complete lack of citation to the record concerning any

claim for money renders any alleged issue concerning this money
"trade" invalid and the court should not reach the merits due to
this lack of citation.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACTS CONCERNING THE LACK
OF CONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE OF
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE.

"To overturn a trial court's finding of fact, Nan appellant
must first marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and
then demonstrate that, even if viewed in the light most favorable
to the trial court, the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the findings."

Bailey-Allen, 945 P.2d at 186 (citing

Coalville City v. Lundareen, 930 P.2d 1206, 1209 (Utah App.
1997)(quoting Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah
1989)), cert, denied, 939 P.2d 683 (Utah 1997).
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Appellant failed

to marshal any evidence in support of the lower court's finding
that x Mi]t is clear from the face of the Findings and Decree that
[Appellee] did not 'trade her interest in [Appellant's]
retirement for any other marital asset . . . [Appellee]
relinquished her right to [Appellant's] retirement for no return.
There was no 'benefit of the bargain.'"
Appellant did not marshal the evidence concerning the
misinformation about Appellee's right to her share of the
retirement account.

Appellant did not marshal the evidence

concerning the lack of consideration for Appellee's waiver of her
rights due to the misinformation.

The majority of Appellant's

brief argues about the existence of some alleged agreement
concerning visitation and some alleged claim concerning marital
funds, however, no facts concerning this alleged agreement are
present in the record, nor were these facts argued at any time to
the lower court.
Due to Appellant's complete lack of marshaling the evidence,
Appellant has failed to demonstrate that if the evidence
supporting the lower court's findings are viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court, the evidence is in any way legally
insufficient to support the findings.
fact can not be set aside.

Therefore, the findings of

Bailey-Allen, 945 P.2d at 186.

III. APPELLANT FAILED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF CONSIDERATION
FOR THE RETIREMENT BENEFITS AT THE TRIAL LEVEL AND
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THEREFORE THE APPELLATE COURT IS PRECLUDED FROM
CONSIDERING THE MERITS OF SAID ISSUE ON APPEAL.
"Issues not raised in the trial court in timely fashion are
deemed waived, precluding [the appellate court] from considering
their merits on appeal."

Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d

653, 655 (Utah App. 1989).

In addition,

N>

[t]o preserve a

substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issues's merits."

LeBaron & Assoc, v.

Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah App.
1991)(citations omitted).
Appellant never raised any issue concerning an exchange of
visitation rights or a claim concerning $25,000 for Appellee's
waiver of her right to her share of the retirement benefits
before the lower court.

Therefore, the lower court was never

provided an opportunity to rule on the merits of that issue.
"[T]he mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at
trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to preserve the
issue for appeal."

Id. at 483 (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d

799, 801 (Utah App. 1987).

Further, this rule is " 'stringently

applied when the new theory depends on controverted factual
questions whose relevance thereto was not made to appear at
trial.'" James, 746 P.2d at 801 (quoting Boaacki v. Board of
Supervisors, 489 P.2d 537, 543-44 (Ca. 1971), cert, denied, 405
9

U.S. 1030 (1972)).
As argued above, in the present case, Appellant never raised
or substantiated any alleged facts concerning the use of
visitation or a claim for money as consideration.

At the lower

court, Appellant argued that Appellee "agreed to waive that right
[to her share of the retirement benefits] because it wasn't of a
great deal of worth to her."

Appellant did not argue that

Appellee contracted her right to her share of the retirement
benefits in exchange for anything.

Appellant never referred to

any consideration at the hearing or in his response to the 60(b)
motion.

Appellant's new theory depends on controverted factual

questions which were not brought up at the lower court.
Therefore, because these issues were not raised at trial and
because they depend on controverted factual allegations which
were not raised at trial, this Court is precluded from
considering the merits of these issues on appeal.

IV.

JUDGE BOHLING DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN GRANTING
APPELLEE'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE IN REGARDS TO THE
RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

"[T]he court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons . . . mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect . . . ."
Civ. PRO. 60(b).

UTAH

R.

The trial court is granted broad discretion on

10

ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).
See Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).
especially true in regards to divorce cases.

This is

See Boyce v. Boyce,

609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980) . "A liberal standard for application of
Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by the doctrine of
continuing jurisdiction that a divorce court has over its
decrees.

Clearly, a court should modify a prior decree when the

interest of equity and fair dealing with the court and the
opposing party so require."

Id. at 931.

In the present case, Judge Bohling had to decide whether or
not to set aside a divorce decree which served to waive
Appellee's legal right to her share of the retirement benefits
without any consideration in return.

In response, Appellant

never argued that there was consideration for Appellee's waiver.
Appellant only argued that Appellee willingly waived her right
because "it wasn't of a great deal of worth to her." However,
this furthers the argument that the agreement was entered into
because of mistake and misinformation because the retirement
benefits were the only substantial marital asset and Appellee's
share has considerable value.1 Appellee was not allowed to
present a claim for the retirement benefits due to the mistaken
1

However, even if Appellant's retirement amounts to
$2,000.00/month for his 20 years of service Appellee's share
would have the value of 7 (years of marriage) divided by 20
(years of service) multiplied by .5 (her share) multiplied by
2000 (the estimated benefit per month), which equals $350.00 per
month, presumably for 20 years, which amounts to $84,000.00.
11

information provided to her concerning her right to the
retirement benefits and the approximate value of those benefits.
Further, Appellee showed due diligence by immediately filing her
motion to set aside upon discovering the mistake.
Appellant cites Land v. Land for the proposition that
"[ejquity is not available to reinstate rights and privileges
voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret
the bargain made."
added).

605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980)(emphasis

Appellant then states that Appellee failed to meet her

burden for the relief she was seeking.

Appellant fails to

realize that there is no contract and no bargain where there is
no consideration.

Because AppeLlee was not allowed to present

her rightful claim to her share of the retirement benefits due to
the mistake and misinformation and given her due diligence as
evidenced by her prompt filing of a motion to set aside, the
trial court's granting of the motion was warranted.

Warren v.

Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1953).
Appellee stated numerous times that she only signed the
stipulation because of the mistake and misinformation provided
her concerning her right to the military retirement benefits.
(Exhibit " A " ) . Appellant counters these statements with the
Affidavit of Mr. Russell.

Judge Bohling had the opportunity to

hear both sides and weigh which side was more credible concerning
Appellee's understanding of her rights and the misinformation

12

concerning the retirement benefits.

(Transcript, p. 15). "The

trial court is in a better position to observe factors bearing on
credibility and [the Appellate Court] will not disturb a factual
assessment unless it clearly appears that the trial court was in
error/'

State v. R.C.F., 863 P.2d 1331, 1333

(Utah App.

1993)(citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d
1363, 1367 (Utah 1993)).

After weighing the different affidavits

and the facts surrounding the decree, Judge Bohling stated that
he was "persuaded that there was excusable neglect and mistake"
and that "a clear right was relinquished for something that did
not seem a basis for the bargain."
In light of the complete lack of consideration for
Appellee's waiver, the fact that the retirement benefits were the
only substantial marital asset, Appellee's affidavit asserting
the mistake and excusable neglect, Appellee's prompt filing of a
motion to set aside upon learning of the mistake, and the broad
discretion granted to the trial court in regards to ruling on
60(b) motions, it is clear that Judge Bohling did not abuse his
discretion in setting aside the decree with regards to the
retirement benefits.
V.

APPELLEE IS ENTITLED TO COURT COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
BECAUSE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS NOT GROUNDED IN FACT AND
NOT WARRANTED BY EXISTING LAW.

"[I]f the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
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shall award just damages, which may include single or double
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to
the prevailing party."

Rule 33

UTAH

R.

APP. PRO.

(1998).

Rule 33

continues by defining a frivolous appeal as "one that is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on
a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing
law."
In Eames v. Eames, this Court held that a husband's appeal
was frivolous where there was no basis for the argument presented
and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated.

735

P.2d 395 (Utah App. 1987); £££ also. Hurt v. Hurt, 793 P.2d 948
(Utah App. 1990).

This is similar to Appellant's present appeal.

Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence, failed to cite to
the record, argued facts not on the record, and raised new issues
on appeal.

Such an appeal is frivolous.

The appeal is not

"grounded in fact," it is merely grounded in allegations which
were not raised at the trial level.

Appellant has failed to

provide any basis for which this Court could grant his appeal.
Therefore, this appeal is without merit and only serves to delay
the lower court's ruling, increase Appellee's costs and
attorney's fees, and waste the time and resources of this Court.
"[S]anctions should be imposed when *an appeal is obviously
without merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of
prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the judgment
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of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and
dissipation of the time and resources of the Law Court.'" Porco
v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988)(quoting Auburn
Harpswell Ass'n v. Dav, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981)).

As argued

in the previous sections, Appellant can not prevail where he
fails to marshal the evidence, fails to cite to the record,
argues new facts on appeal, and raises new issues on appeal.
This frivolous appeal has greatly increased Appellee's costs and
attorney's fees and serves only to impede the implementation of
the proper ruling of the lower court and waste the time and
resources of this Court.
Therefore, pursuant to Rule 33, Appellee should be awarded
her costs and attorney's fees in connection with this frivolous
appeal in addition to any other damages this Court, in its
discretion, decides to award Appellee.

CONCLUSION
Appellant has clearly failed to marshal the evidence, or any
admissible evidence, in support of his appeal.

Appellant has

also failed to cite to the record in support of his appeal.
Appellant has raised new issues and disputed "facts" not raised
at any time on the trial court level.

The facts, case law, and

equity support the decision made by the trial court.

Based on

the foregoing, the decision of the trial court should be

15

affirmed.

Further, Appellee should be awarded her reasonable

attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Rule 33 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _J

day of June, 1998.

ILLIAMS, P.C,

J E T . WILLIAMS
^Attorney for Appellee/Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on this

of June, 1998, I mailed two

true and accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE,
postage pre-paid, to:
Jerry SclyfSllian
1352 South/74#TE
Orem, Ut
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT "A"

- Affidavit of Defendant

EXHIBIT "B"

- Excerpt of Transcript from Hearing

EXHIBIT "C" - Appellant's Docketing Statement
EXHIBIT "D"

- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

18

Tab A

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND STIPULATION,
AND MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT

DENNIS EARL WHEELER,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

Case No. 954902697 DA
DIANE DAWN WHEELER,
Judge William B. Bohling
Comm. Lisa A. Jones

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
ss.
)

COMES NOW THE AFFIANT, Diane Dawn Wheeler, and, being first
duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah and

over the age of 21 years.
2.

I am the Defendant in the above-captioned matter, the

parties having been married on November 4, 1988.
3.

The parties have two children, Devin, who is seven years

of age, and Valerie, who is five years of age.
4.

Plaintiff is a Second Lieutenant with the Army and has

been so employed for, approximately, ten years.

rq^^CJlo^\/|q

Q/l'uHh

Affiant was a

homemaker and has no work skills, except for cashiering, and at the
time of the entry of the Decree, and currently, earns a gross of,
approximately, $750.00 per month.
5.

That at the time of the parties' settlement agreement and

divorce, Affiant was informed that Plaintiff would have an income
of, approximately, $2,500.00 because he would not get the dependent
rate.

However, Affiant was informed that Plaintiff remarried two

to four days after the divorce became final and thus received an
increase in pay of, approximately, $500.00.

Affiant is informed

and believes that Plaintiff knew that he was going to remarry and
have this adjustment.
6.

Affiant does not have the money necessary to pay for one-

half of the costs for transportation for the minor children to
visit with their father.

Affiant also is in need of greater child

support based upon Plaintiff's higher income.
7.

Affiant retained Steven C. Russell as her counsel to

represent her in this divorce action.

Mr. Russell did not keep

Affiant informed as to her rights or obligations in this divorce.
On

every

occasion

that

Affiant

approached

her

counsel

with

concerns, her counsel would always tell her "Just relax and don't
worry about it."

"I'll take care of it."

Her counsel was telling

her this at the date of the pretrial before Commissioner Lisa A.
Jones.

At that time, as well, Affiant tried to find out what the

meaning of joint custody, but her attorney did not explain it to
2

her and told her "Don't worry about it." On each occasion when the
Affiant expressed to her counsel the fact that she did not like the
terms of the agreement that was being proposed, her counsel told
her "This is the best you can do " When Affiant asked her counsel
about her rights to the Plaintiff's retirement, Affiant's counsel
told her "You will never get it."
8.

Affiant entered into the settlement agreement resulting

in this divorce action based upon the misinformation and lack of
direction provided to her by her then attorney. Affiant feels that
she was operating under extreme duress and pressure

The divorce

action had proceeded in an unusual fashion and Affiant had received
no support or direction from her attorney.

For example, on or

about September 1, 1995, Plaintiff's counsel commenced telephoning
Affiant at her home and at her work, trying to get her to sign a
stipulation regarding an upcoming contempt motion.

Affiant told

Plaintiff's counsel, Jerry Schollian, that she would not talk to
him.
m

Regardless, he arrived at her home at 11:00 p.m., with papers

hand to have her sign a stipulation and release.

Affiant's

counsel was not present and Plaintiff's counsel was not invited to
Defendant's home.

Plaintiff's counsel, however, had in his hand

child support checks and a receipt for her to sign to satisfy
arrears and to avoid an upcoming contempt hearing.

Affiant needed

the funds and took the money from him. When Affiant approached her
counsel about this unusual contact, he said not to worry about it.
3

9.

I have been the primary caretaker of the children. Until

the Christmas visitation this year, the longest

time that the

children were away from me was for two or three days and one one
occassion, five days.

I was pressured into agreeing to have them

gone from me for six weeks and up to eight weeks the following
year.

I do not believe that it is in the children's best interest

to be gone from me for that long.

Affiant believes that they are

too young. When Affiant questioned her attorney, he indicated that
he believed the visitation was reasonable and that she should agree
to it.

However, Affiant's attorney never explained to her what

joint custody was to mean or how she was to effectuate joint
custody.

She was told that it was reasonable to agree to joint

custody without understanding what she was agreeing to.
10.

It is clear from the actions of the Plaintiff that the

Affiant and Plaintiff cannot exercise joint custody and cooperate
and coordinate with one another.

For example, with the Christmas

visitation, the Plaintiff took the children to the State of Alabama
without even telling Defendant that he would be going there.

He

failed to provide Affiant with a telephone number or address where
she could contact the kids and then informed Affiant's daughter
that the Affiant did not even care enough to call her child.
Further, the Plaintiff made all the arrangements for the travel for
the visitation and did so without consulting with Affiant.

It was

Plaintiff that decided how and what the travel was to be and then
4

merely informed Affiant what her one-half share would be.

By that

time, the Affiant had already made plans to drive the children to
the Plaintiff's home for Christmas.
11.

Affiant firmly believes that she was misinformed, mislead

and not represented in her divorce settlement.

Affiant is not

simply having "buyer's remorse" or "sour grapes."
since

consulted

with

her present

counsel

Affiant has

and learned and

understands h e r rights and obligations, including her right to onehalf of the Plaintiff's retirement accrued during the marriage. If
Affiant had known her legal rights, she would not have entered into
the agreement at pretrial.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED t h i s

\\

day o f ^ O f c l V I ^ U X W ^

1996.

U
^A \ W L IQtvflM'l
DIME DAWN WHEELER
ON THE

ll day ot-yL^^^^

V

'/f~~

, 1996, personally

?

appeared before me, the undersigned notary, DIANE DAWN WHEELER, the
signer of the foregoing Affidavit, who duly acknowledged to me the
Affidavit w a s signed
purp(0§^r:'v.:; ~
^,,^ , -

the same voluntarily

and for its stated

SForV?n >v *r •, {'
... _ _,. ....,.' &*
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NOTARY
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PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon
8c Williams, attorneys for the Defendant herein, and that I caused
the foregoing Affidavit to be served upon Plaintiff by placing a
true and correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to:
Jerry Schollian
Attorney at Law
111 East Broadway, #340
SLC, Utah 84111
and depositing the same in the United States mail, first class
postage prepaid thereon, on the i^:' day ofvC^AA^XOto

Secretary
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, 1996.
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on active duty you cannot get your retirement until 60
years of age.

For that reason the defendant agreed

to

waive that right because it wasn't of a great deal of
worth to her.
I refer the Court to Birch versus Birch-- says
that if when someone willingly waives a right, you can't
go back and get it back again when it was waived.
she was fully and fairly

And

informed.

The defendants counsel has said that
relying on surprise and excusable neglect.
disagree with that, your Honor.

they're

I strongly

When she had counsel

had a lot of time to think about it.

she

If you will look at

the attachments in my memorandum, the defendant

prepared

a divorce complaint and it was negotiated back and
forth.

My client filed a complaint that was acted upon.

It wasn't until December

1995, six months after the

initial negotiation, it was signed by this Court.
The defendant had a long time to think

about

t h i s , a long time to deliberate about it, a long time to
get counsel.

She got counsel.

For her to come back

immediately after the divorce decree is signed and say,
w e l l , I didn't know any better, does not reflect the
facts of the case.
I'm not trying to accuse anyone of being
dishonest.

The defendant probably feels her position is
12
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COPY
Jerry Schollian (6326)
A Professional Corporation
37 East Center Street, Suite 208
Provo, UT 84601

Tel: (801)-377-6500
Attorney fn Plaintiff
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DENNIS EARL WHEELER
Plaintiff/Appellant

:

DOCKETING STATEMENT

:

Case No. 970256-CA

vs.
DIANA DAWN WHEELER
Defendant/Appellee.

In accordance with Utah Rule Of Appellate Procedure 9, Appellant, by and through his
attorney of record, hereby submits the following docketing statement
1.

DATE OF ENTRY OF ORDER APPEALED FROM: April 14, 1997;

2.

NATURE OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND DATES FILED:
a) Motion Requesting Entry Of Specific Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law

Date Filed: March 19, 1997
b) Court's Minute Entry, Ordering defendant's counsel to enter specific findings of
tact and conclusions o* law: Date: March 26, 1997.
c) Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law: Filed on or about April 22, 1997.

3.

DATE OF EFFECT OF ORDERS DISPOSING OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS

AND ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER Utah R. Civ. P.
54(b). NONE
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4.

DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: April 22, 1997

5.

JURISDICTION: The Utah Court Of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter in

accordance with Utah Code Ann. §76-2a-3(2)(h), (1953 as amended).
6.

NAME OF TRIAL COURT: Third Judicial District Court

7.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
a. The parties in this matter were married less than ten (10) years;
b. In August, 1995, the parties meet for more than three (3) hours in the office

of Susan Bradford, the attorney for the Guardian Ad Litem, and negotiated the terms of their
divorce, (hereinafter, "settlement conference.*). Both parties were represented by counsel at the
meeting.
c. In October, 1995, the parties meet in the chambers of Commissioner Lisa
Jones and read into the record a stipulation which was agreed to at the meeting. All parties were
represented by counsel at said meeting.
d. In the parties stipulation, defendant willingly relinquished all rights to-ahy
equitable portion of the plaintiffs military pension. See Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of
Law,atfl18.
e. On December 7, 1995, the divorce decree was finalized by the Third District
Court
f.

On January 18, 1996, defendant filed a motion under Utah Rule Of Civil

Procedure 60(b), to set aside the divorce decree.
g. On February 15, 1996, a hearing was held before Commissioner Jones on the
defendant's Rule 60(b) motion.
h. On or around July 18, 1996, the Honorable William Bohling entered an order
on the defendant's rule 60(b) motion in which the defendant's motion was denied.
i. Defendant subsequently filed an objection to the Commissioner's findings and
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also filed a motion to amend the decree based on the same arguments set forth in the
defendant's Rule 60(b) motion.
j . On March 18, 1997, a hearing was held on the defendant's motion to set aside
the Commissioner's findings as to the defendant's Rule 60(b) motion before the Honorable
William Bohling Judge Bohiing overruled the all of the defendant's objections except for the
objection as to defendant's equitable rights in the plaintiffs military retirement
k.

As a basis for his ruling, Judge Bohling held that the defendant received

no "benefit of her bargain."
8.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. The Court abused its discretion by allowing the defendant to recapture rights she had
willingly given away in the stipulation of the parties. Equity does not provide the defendant with
the remedy she seeks under Rule 60(b). See Birch v. Birch. 609 P.2d 928, (Utah 1989), see
also Bovce v. Bovce. 609 P.2d 928, (Utah 1980).
II. The defendant's objections to the stipulation which she willingly agreed to are bared by
the principle of res judicata. See Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, (UL Ct App.
1988).
III. The defendant does not have a legal right to the plaintiffs nonvested military
reti/pment benefits, inasmuch as the parties were not married for ten (10) years as required by
the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §1408.
S

DETERMINATION OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT. This case is not subject tw

^ovieyv by the Utah Supreme Court.
10.

DETERMINATIVE LAW:

Ut. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
Birch v. Birch. 609 P.2d928, (Utah 1989)
Bovce v. Bovce. 6G9P.2dS28, (Utah 1980).
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Throckmorton v Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
Jacobsonv Jacobson. 703 P.2d 303 (Utah, 1989)
11.

RELATED APPEALS: There are no other appeals in this matter

12.

ATTACHMENTS: The following documents are attached to this docketing

statement
a. Order On Defendant's Objection To Commissioner's Findings.
b. Motion For An Order Of Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
c. Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
d. Notice Of Appeal
e. Request For Transcript
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 3 3

c\

/day of June,

erryfSchoilian^
:omW For Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This certifies that the undersigned has mailed a true and accurate copy of the preceding
document to the following parties:
Original to and three (3) copies to:
Utah Court Of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Copies to:
Ms. Kellie Williams
808 East Center Street,
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
DATED this 2 3

day of June, 1997
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
DENNIS EARL WHEELER,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

Plaintiff,
-vsCase No. 954902697 DA
DIANE _ DAWN. WHEELER,,
Defendant.

Judge William B. Bohling
Comm. Lisa A. Jones

THE ABOVE CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for
hearing before the above-entitled court on March 18, 1997, at the
hour of 9:00 a.m., the Honorable William B. Bohling, Third Judicial
District Court Judge, presiding, on Defendant's Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate
and Set Aside Decree of Divorce and Stipulation and Motion for
Relief from Judgement, and Plaintiff not being present in person,
but being represented by counsel, Jerry Schollian, and Defendant
being present in person and being represented by counsel, Kellie F.
and the court having reviewed the court file, including Defendant's
motion to set aside Decree, Plaintiff's response, Affidavit of
Steven Russell, and the commissioner's recommendation and resulting

order, and having heard the proffers and arguments of counsel, and
based thereon, the court now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on November 4, 1988

and divorced by this court -on December 7, 1995.
2.

During the course of the parties' marriage, Plaintiff was

employed in the United States Armed Forces.

Defendant was a

homemaker and accrued no retirement during the marriage.

The

parties had two children.
3.

The

Decree

of

Divorce

and

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law were entered by this court on December 7, 1995,
which Decree, among other things, awarded Plaintiff all right,
title and interest in his military retirement and did not award
Defendant her marital share.
4.

At the time of the parties' divorce, the parties did not

own any real property.
5.

At the time of the parties' divorce, Defendant was

awarded a very minimal alimony award and ordered to pay one-half of
the costs of transportation for purposes of Plaintiff exercising
visitation with the minor children. Further, within the Decree of
Divorce, in lieu of any claim that Plaintiff had on the parties'
household furnishings and other jointly owned property, Defendant
agreed to pay her own attorney's fees.
2

There was no other

substantial property and within the Decree, it was found that all
personal property accumulated by the parties had been divided,
6.

Subsequent to the entry of the Decree, Defendant sought

new counsel and on or about January 19-, 1996, Defendant timely
filed a 60(b) motion for relief from judgment and to set aside the
Decree.

Within that motion

and

an accompanying affidavit,

Defendant stated under oath that she was never informed by her
prior counsel of any rights to Plaintiff's retirement and that she
was informed "you will never get it."
7.

Under 10 U.S.C. §1406(d)(2), a spouse or former spouse

cannot be paid their retirement directly from the military fund and
the retainer pay of the member unless they have been married for
ten years during which there was ten years of service creditable to
the member's retired pay. However, every state that has addressed
the issue of a possible ten-year limitation on the award of the
military retirement by the state court has rejected such an
interpretation, holding that the ten-year provision in the U.S.
Code applies only to situations in which direct payments are to be
made by the secretary of a particular branch of the service to the
non-military spouse. See, Marriage of Wood and Wood, 676 P.2d 338
(Or. App. 1984); Oxelorren v. Oxelqren, 670 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App. 2
Dist. 1984); Konzen v. Konzen, 693 P.2d 97 (Wash. 1985); Levine v.
Spickelmier, 707 P.2d 452 (Idaho 1985); Pacheco v. Ouintana, 730
3

P.2d 1 (N.W. App. 1985); Beltran v. Beltran, 227 Cal Rptr. 924
(Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1986); Butcher v. Butcher, 375 W.E.2d 226 (W.
Va. 1987); Stone v. Stone, 725 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. App. 1987); Scott v.
Scott, 519 So.2d 351 (La. App. 2 Dir. 1988); Parker v. Parker. 750
P.2d 1313 (Wy. 1988); Carranza v. Carranza, 765 S.W.2d 32 (Ky. App.
1989); Warren v. Warren, 563 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1990);
DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So.2d 956 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1991) ; King
v. King, 605 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio App. 12 Dist. 1992).
8.

In the state of Utahf

Defendant is entitled to an

equitable interest in Plaintiff's military pension.

Woodward v.

Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
9.

It is clear from the face of the Findings and Decree that

Defendant did not "trade" her interest in Plaintiff's retirement
for any other marital asset•

The marital assets of the parties

were limited and the retirement appears to be the only substantial
asset acquired by the parties during the marriage •
10.

Defendant had a clear right to a portion of Plaintiff's

retirement.
11.

Defendant

relinquished

her

right

to

Plaintiff's

retirement for no return. There was no "benefit of the bargain."
12.

The affidavit of Defendant indicates to the court that

there was clearly not an understanding by Defendant of her rights
to Plaintiff's retirement and that her agreement to the award of
4

military retirement in full to Plaintiff constitutes mistake and
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes
and enters the following: .
CONCLUSIONS OF IAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Defendant

in this action and over the subject matter of this action*
2.

Defendant promptly and timely filed a motion pursuant to

Rule 60(b) of the TJtah Rules of Civil Procedure and, as to the
military- retirement, Defendants motion should be granted.
3.

No

other terms or conditions

contained within the

parties' Decree of Divorce should be set aside.
DATED this

day of

, 199
BY THE COURT

WILLIAM B. BOHLING
District Court Judge
Approved:

JERRY SCHOLLIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
DATED:
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